

WP9: Airborne System Design Requirements

Overview

Petr Cásek iFly Mid Term Review, September 29, 2009






WP 9 Outline

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Goal:

Perform a preliminary Safety Performance Requirements (SPR) development cycle according ED78A/DO-264

Schedule & WBS



WP9 Team

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| Partner | HNWL | Isdefe | NLR | ENAC | UCAM | Dedale | ETHZ | UTartu | EEC | NTUA | Total |
|-----------|------|--------|-----|------|------|--------|------|--------|-----|------|-------|
| WP9.1 | 8 | 1 | 0.5 | 0.5 | | 0.5 | | 0.5 | 0.5 | | 11.5 |
| WP9.2 | 9 | 1 | 0.5 | | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | | 0.5 | 12.5 |
| WP9.3 | 8 | 4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | | 0.5 | | 0.5 | 0.5 | 15.5 |
| WP9.4 | 5 | | 0.5 | 0.5 | | | | | | | 6.0 |
| Total WP9 | 30 | 6 | 2 | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 45.5 |

Presentation Outline

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
✓ WP9.1 – OSED

- Considered Inputs
- Applied Approach
- OSED Overview
- Next/Ongoing steps
 - Operational Safety Assessment
 - Operational Performance Assessment



WP9 Inputs: Internal within the iFly Project

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WP9 Inputs: External

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Surveillance

- MASPS for Aircraft Surveillance Applications DO-289
- ADS-B MASPS DO-242A
- 1090 MOPS DO-260A
- > ASAS
 - Action Plan 23 deliverables D3, D4
 - ASAS MOPS DO-317 (Surveillance)
- ASAS Package I
 - ATSA ITP: SPR DO-312, NASA HIL Study
 - ATSA VSA: SPR DO-313
 - ATSA AIRB/SURF, ASPA-IM: monitoring evolution of SC-186/WG-51 RFG work on OSED, OSA, OPA documents
- > ACAS
 - TCAS II high-level documentation
 - TCAS II MOPS DO-185



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Two different views on A3 operations:


Airborne Perspective

- Processing of detected events
- Performance-focused parameterization
- High-level functional system requirements


Operational Perspective

- Focus on information (trajectory) sharing
- Decomposition of A3 operations into stages

ASAS Separation Management: Reaction to detected threats




Functional Blocks = a set of related functionalities



Operational View – Decomposition to Stages

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Operational perspective: Trajectory status is key.



Operational Stages vs. Functional Blocks

| | Functional blocks | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------|--------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| Stages | Navigation | Surveillance | Events Handling | Trajectory modification | Tactical maneuver | | | | | |
| Regular Flight Stage | x | X | | | | | | | | |
| Initiation Stage | x | Х | Х | | | | | | | |
| Enhanced Monitoring Stage | x | Х | Х | | | | | | | |
| New Trajectory Generation Stage | х | Х | Х | Х | | | | | | |
| Tactical Maneuvering Stage | x | Х | Х | | Х | | | | | |

WP9: Next Steps

OSED ✓ Operational Environment \checkmark Air traffic services ✓ High-level Functional System Description ✓ Procedure (Operations) Description ✓ Operational Performance Expectations **WP9.1 OSA OPA** > Safety Requirements to meet **Performance Requirements to Target Levels of Safety (TLS)** meet overall Target Levels of during abnormal conditions. Safety (TLS) during nominal > Allocation and specification of conditions. **WP9.3 Safety Objectives** WP9.2 **ASDR** Summarize the results of OSA/OPA process into a consistent set of requirements on the airborne system **WP9.4**

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OSA – The Conventional ED-78 Approach


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Operational Hazard Analysis

- Brainstorming sessions (WP7)
- Expert judgment

Event Tree Analysis

- External Mitigation Means
- Equivalent Probability determination
- Impact classification
 - Classification of severity
 - TLS specified
- Fault Tree Analysis
 - Internal Mitigation Means
 - Allocation of Safety Objectives





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Information sharing process


Onboard conflict processing

Communications (Data link) performance

OPA – Onboard Performance Modeling


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Based on the parameterization introduced by OSED (D9.1).



OPA – Communications Performance

- > ICAO 9869 defines Required Communication Performance (RCP) parameters
- OPA will perform assessment of the four RCP type parameters using the DO-264/ED-78A methodology:
 - Maximum **transaction time** acceptable for the completion of the communication operation (normal operation is represented by a 95% transaction time);



- **Continuity**, i.e. probability that the communication operation can be completed within the transaction time, assuming the system was available;
- Availability, i.e. probability that the communication operation can be initiated when needed;
- **Integrity**, i.e. probability the communication operation is completed with an undetected error.

Thank You!



Any Questions...



